Shocks affecting the rate at which investment goods are transformed into capital stock have been identified as a major driver of the business cycle. Such shocks have been linked to frictions in financial markets, because financial markets are instrumental in transforming consumption goods into installed capital. Yet we show that the importance of these investment shocks is greatly diminished when collateral constraints on firms are introduced into an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In the presence of binding collateral constraints, risk premium shocks take on a more prominent role as drivers of the business cycle. Modellers of business cycle fluctuations need to be mindful of the incompatibility of investment shocks and collateral constraints and of the difficulty in specifying 'structural' shocks that are robust to modest amendments to the frictions present in a model.
Introduction
Do shocks to investment drive the business cycle? A number of papers over the last decade suggest that investment shocks account for the majority of the variation in key macroeconomic aggregates. 1 The role of investment shocks has also come into renewed focus following the recent financial crisis. Financial intermediation affects the transformation of savings into usable, installed capital. Likewise, investment shocks affect the economy's ability to transform consumption goods into productive capital and thus play a parallel role to the process of financial intermediation. Justiniano et al. (2011) , for example, draw an explicit link between shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment and credit risk spreads. Credit spreads imply the existence of a material financial friction, yet the model in Justiniano et al. (2011) has no such friction.
Our principal aim in this paper is to investigate the role and transmission mechanism of investment shocks in the presence of financial frictions. More specifically, we introduce a collateral constraint, similar to that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Gerali et al. (2010) , into the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) .
Using a data set that extends from 1954Q3 through to 2011Q4 for the United States (US), we estimate our amended model and compute the contribution of structural shocks to the cyclical variation of output, investment, consumption and so on. We demonstrate that the introduction of financial frictions in the form of a collateral constraint materially alters which shocks are thought to be the most important drivers of the business cycle. The intuition behind our result is simple: a positive investment shock lowers the relative price of capital goods, Tobin's q, and leads to an investment boom. However, when entrepreneurs are subject to binding collateral constraints, a reduction in the value of installed capital reduces the value of collateral and thus the amount an entrepreneur can borrow. As a result, the initial response of investment to a positive investment shock is attenuated by the decline in available credit. In the presence of a collateral constraint, however, the increase in investment cannot be financed via increased borrowing and is therefore accompanied by a decline in entrepreneurial consumption. Consequently, investment shocks struggle to generate the positive correlation between consumption and investment that is observed in the data.
In our model, the shock affecting the cost of borrowing -the risk premium or consumption shock -is a major driver of cyclical fluctuations in output and other macroeconomic variables.
This risk premium shock accounts for around half of the variation in output and consumption, and 40 percent of the variation in investment and interest rates. There is also a striking conformity between the estimated risk premium shock and the US business cycle. 2 The collateral constraint also has a material effect on the transmission of risk premium shocks. Contrary to the transmission mechanism of investment shocks described above, a stimulatory risk premium shock causes demand to rise and Tobin's q to increase. This implies that entrepreneurs face a looser borrowing constraint, and thus the impact of the risk premium shock is amplified for both consumption and investment.
Like us, Christiano et al. (2011) and Christiano et al. (2014) observe that the contribution of IST shocks to the variance of GDP is diminished when a financial friction is introduced into the model. Our work differs from those papers in two main respects. First, we have a collateral constraint rather than an external finance premium as our financial friction. Second, in the above papers the IST shock remains an important driver of GDP dynamics except when financial variables are included as observables, whereas in our model -even with just the standard Smets-Wouters observables -the contribution of the IST shock to cyclical dynamics is largely annihilated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model used in the analysis. The model closely follows that of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano et al. (2010) , but we add impatient entrepreneurs who are collateral constrained. Section 3 discusses the estimation of the model. Section 4 looks at the role of investment specific technology (IST) and risk premium shocks as cyclical drivers. 3 In section 5 and section 6, we discuss the results 2 See Figure 2 . 3 We refer to investment specific technology shocks in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2007) . Other authors of our paper and their robustness.
Model
Our model is based on the familiar New Keynesian model put forward by Smets and Wouters (2007) . Households consume (and save) and supply labour. The household income that underpins consumption and saving is obtained from wages, and from dividend streams from owning the firms that produce final goods. Households smooth consumption over time by investing in deposits issued by competitive financial intermediaries. The model has various nominal and real frictions including price and wage rigidities (with backward inflation indexation), habit formation in consumption, and adjustment costs for investment. The model also has variable capital utilization and fixed costs.
We modify the baseline Smets-Wouters model by introducing entrepreneurial agents who are subject to a borrowing constraint. 4 Introducing an additional agent into the model provides scope for borrowing and lending in the steady state. We assume that borrowing is limited to a fraction χ of the present value of the future capital stock owned by the entrepreneur. Mendoza (2006) provides a general specification for collateral constraints nesting the one employed in our paper. Our approach is similar to the 'margin constraint' in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) , which hinges on the value of capital owned. Debt is one-period, so the stock of capital financed by household lending to the entrepreneurs needs to to be re-financed each period.
We adopt a borrowing constraint because it is a parsimonious financial friction, and has a pedigree in theoretical models dating back to at least Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that collateralization of debt is ubiquitous (see for example Berger and Udell 1990 , Harhoff and Korting 1998 and Jimenez et al. 2006 ; collateral requirements are consistent with the notion that entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity is constrained by the value of (such as Justiniano et al. 2011 ) make a distinction between IST shocks, which affect the transformation of consumption goods into investment, and shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI shocks), which affect the transformation of investment into productive capital.
4 Lombardo and McAdam (2012) also introduce borrowing constraints into the Smets-Wouters model, but in their model, the constraint binds for households, while firms are subject to costly state verification. their assets.
Entrepreneurs are responsible for all investment. We assume that entrepreneurs have a higher rate of time preference than households and are therefore more impatient. The entrepreneurs' impatience causes the collateral constraint to be binding even in steady state, unlike Mendoza (2008) . Entrepreneurial impatience means that entrepreneurs can beneficially exchange current consumption for future consumption by borrowing from households. This intertemporal substitution is enabled by investment in capital goods. All agents, both households and entrepreneurs, are subject to the same stochastic shocks, and thus there is no idiosyncratic risk to insure away.
As discussed by Iacoviello (2005) , the return to investment exceeds the return to savings so that the collateral constraint is binding, but we do not want entrepreneurs to postpone consumption to self-fund all of the desired investment, which is prevented by the entrepreneur's impatience.
Entrepreneurs are the agents who own the capital stock. They finance consumption and investment expenditure by renting out capital goods to final goods producers and through borrowing from households, via notional financial intermediaries.
In our description of the model below, we limit our discussion to those parts of the model that differ from Smets and Wouters (2007) , focusing on the decision problems of households and entrepreneurs. A full set of linearized model equations is presented in Appendix A.
Households
The representative household maximizes the following utility function:
subject to
The j th household maximizes utility by choosing consumption at time t, C j,t , and hours worked L j,t . β is the discount factor; h dictates the degree of habit persistence; σ l is the elasticity of substitution with respect to the real wage; and σ c in conjunction with the habit term determines the intertemporal substitution elasticity for households. The flow constraint has consumption and real deposits (B j,t /P t ) equal to profits, Π j,t , labour income (real wages W j,t multiplied by hours worked) and the value of real deposits from last period scaled up by the gross effective nominal interest rate R f t−1 divided by the gross inflation rate, π t . The gross effective nominal interest rate is defined as R f t ≡ R t ε c,t where ε c,t is a risk premium shock, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) , and R t is the gross risk free policy rate.
The household's first order conditions for consumption and deposits are summarized by the following set equations. The marginal utility of consumption at time t, denoted λ t , is:
The Euler equation for households can then be represented as:
The savings, or deposits of the household, B t /P t , are lent to entrepreneurs, who use these funds to purchase capital goods. These capital goods are rented out to final goods-producing firms (which are in turn owned by the households).
Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur maximizes the expected utility:
where C e denotes entrepreneurial consumption. Entrepreneurs are subject to the following budget constraint:
In each period, the entrepreneur purchases consumption goods C e j,t and new capital stock, K j,t , at price Q t . These purchases are financed by net borrowing from households (
), rental income on capital goods net of capital utilization costs (R k t Z t K j,t−1 − a(Z t )K j,t−1 ), the proceeds from selling last period's capital stock net of depreciation (Q t (1 − δ)K j,t−1 ), and profit from the intermediate production of capital (Π e t ). Because entrepreneurs are more impatient than households, they face the following borrowing constraint on their degree of leverage:
where χ is the loan-to-value ratio (LVR), which dictates the maximum permissible leverage ratio.
This constraint is on the future value of capital, hence E t Q t+1 , because any default and required loan recovery will occur in the future. Because of the assumption that β > β e , the constraint is always binding in the neighborhood of the steady state.
The optimality conditions for the entrepreneur's consumption, borrowing, capital purchases, and capital utilization are as follows:
where λ e and λ B are the Lagrange multipliers on the flow and borrowing constraints respectively, R k t is the return on capital and Z t is capital utilization.
The presence of λ B in the first order conditions represents the effects of the borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs' allocation of consumption and capital purchases. Consider, for example, a case where the borrowing constraint is exogenously relaxed. This results in a decline in the shadow value of the constraint, λ B . For constant real interest rates, the Euler equation
suggests that a looser borrowing constraint would be associated with higher consumption. Likewise, for a constant path of the effective interest rate, a looser borrowing constraint implies a higher value of installed capital, Q, and thus higher investment.
Capital producers
The capital stock is produced by firms, wholly owned by the entrepreneurs. The j th representative capital-producing firm maximizes the following profit function:
where Λ e t is the stochastic discount factor of the owner, in this case the entrepreneur, and net capital accumulation is defined as:
where δ is the depreciation rate, ε µ,t is an investment-specific shock, and the function S(I j,t , I j,t−1 ))I j,t captures investment adjustment costs. The investment adjustment cost function is quadratic in the ratio of investment to its lag. Substituting (13) into (12) yields:
Assuming that the adjustment cost function S(I j,t , I j,t−1 ) takes the form
, where γ is the gross steady state growth rate of the economy, the optimality condition for investment is given by:
Adjustment costs dampen the response of investment to various shocks and play an important role in the dynamics of Tobin's q -the relative price of firms' collateral in our model.
The rest of the model
The rest of the model directly follows Smets and Wouters (2007) and thus we only provide a very brief description. A complete set of linearized model equations is presented in Table 8 in
Output of final goods is a function of effective capital, labour and technology. Final goods producers rent capital services with a given degree of utilization from entrepreneurs, and labour services from household unions.
Goods and labour markets are monopolistically competitive with both prices and wages being set in a time-dependent manner as put forward by Calvo (1983) , albeit with partial indexation to past inflation for those price and wage setters not called upon to re-price in a given time period.
Government spending is simply modelled as a stochastic share of GDP. Monetary policy is modelled by a generalized Taylor-type interest rate rule that links the current period policy rate to its lag, to deviations of the current period inflation rate from target, to deviations in the output gap, and to changes in the growth rate of the output gap.
The output gap is defined as the difference between output in the sticky price allocation of the model and output corresponding to a flexible price allocation. In the flexible price allocation there are no nominal rigidities in either price or wage setting, and hence there is no role for monetary policy.
Shocks
There are seven shocks perturbing the economy. The risk premium (ε c,t ) and investment specific technology shock (ε µ,t ), discussed above, are augmented with shocks to total factor productivity (ε a,t ), the share of government spending in GDP (ε g,t ), the interest rate rule (ε r,t ), and shocks to the price and wage Phillips curves (ε p,t and ε w,t ). 5 These shocks all exhibit some degree of persistence, as described in the following equations:
The various autoregressive and moving average (MA) coefficients are represented by ρ. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we include a feedback term between the innovation in technology and government spending, ρ (g,a) , in the shock term for exogenous government spending, as well as MA terms in the price and wage shocks to capture high frequency fluctuations in price and wage dynamics. The innovations ζ j,t are normal, independent and identically distributed.
An alternative model
To isolate the effects of borrowing constraints on the business cycle, we estimate two versions of our model: the model presented above, and an alternative model where entrepreneurs are identical to households in terms of their rate of time preference and thus do not face borrowing 5 The flexible price allocation used to construct the output gap is not affected by either εr,t, εp,t or εw,t.
constraints. This alternative is essentially the model put forward by Smets and Wouters (2007) .
Bayesian estimation
The following seven observables are used to estimate the two versions of the model: the growth rates of GDP, aggregate consumption, and investment; real wages; inflation; the short-term nominal interest rate; and hours worked. Given that we have seven stochastic shocks in the model, we avoid stochastic singularity. The data used to estimate the models are described in Appendix B. We denote 'aggregate' consumption as C a since it corresponds to the sum of household and entrepreneurial consumption in our model. As in Justiniano et al. (2010) , consumption corresponds to private consumption of non-durable goods, while investment is defined as the sum of gross domestic private investment and consumption of durable goods.
The models are estimated using standard Bayesian techniques. For the most part the priors for the model are the same as those employed by Smets and Wouters. There are two innocuous caveats to this statement. First, we use a Gamma prior instead of a Normal prior for the labourdisutility parameter, σ l , though with the same mean and variance used in Smets and Wouters. 6 Second, we estimate the household's discount rate using a Gamma prior with a mean of 0.25 and a standard deviation of 0.1, though the data are found to be somewhat uninformative for these priors. Other authors such as Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) calibrate this parameter directly.
The model with borrowing constraints has two parameters without analogues in the original Smets-Wouters model: (i) the loan-to-value ratio, χ, and (ii) the gap between the discount rates of the households and entrepreneurs,β. Given that the LVR is a device to ensure that entrepreneur's have equity in their investment ventures, the LVR is assumed to fall within (0,1).
More specifically the prior for the LVR is a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.15. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) calibrate the LVR to be 0.85, suggesting that it is difficult to estimate without data on debt and housing holdings of credit-constrained households.
Our mean posterior parameter estimates for the LVR are close to our prior value of 0.51, but the data are somewhat informative, indicating that the probability mass should be more tightly grouped around the mean value. When taking the model to a shortened data sample, ending before the beginning of the Great Recession, we obtain a posterior mean of 0.54 for the same prior.
The prior distribution for the discount rate gap,β, is a Gamma distribution with a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.5. This prior distribution implicitly encompasses the calibrated discount factors for impatient borrowers used in Iacoviello (2005) While our prior range does not fully encompass this cross-sectional variation we think it provides a sufficiently broad range for what one might assume is the average impatient entrepreneur.
Finally, we calibrate the depreciation rate to 0.025 and the share of government spending in GDP to 0.22. Following Smets and Wouters (2007) , we set the Kimball aggregator parameters, ǫ p and ǫ w , to 10 and calibrate the steady state wage mark-up to 1.5. Tables 1 and 2 report the posterior mean and 90 percent posterior probability intervals for the structural parameters and the standard deviations of the shocks for the model with and without collateral constraints. The reported parameter estimates for the models are based on 900,000 draws of Markov chains. 'Trace-plots' of deciles from the two Markov chains are available from the authors upon request.
The posterior estimates for the common structural parameters in the two models are broadly similar. They suggest a high degree of nominal price and wage rigidity, a significant degree of habit persistence and sluggish investment adjustment. Differences between the two models arise primarily in the size and persistence of investment and risk premium shocks. In the presence of borrowing constraints, investment shocks become more volatile but less persistent. Risk premium shocks, however, are estimated to be less volatile but more persistent. Introducing borrowing constraints also lowers the mean of the posterior estimates of the capital utilization and investment adjustment cost parameters, relative to the model without borrowing constraints.
The additional structure that we have introduced with the two agent types and the borrowing constraint has come at a cost. Like Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013), we find that empirical fit is adversely affected by the introduction of the borrowing constraint. Estimates of the (log) marginal data densities of the models with and without the borrowing constraint are reported in Table 3 . 7 The modified harmonic mean estimate is based on an average of the draws from the Markov chains, and the Laplace estimate is based on a second order approximation of that log marginal data density (which approximates the data density using a Normal distribution).
Bayes factors can be computed from these log marginal data densities, which can then be used to compare the two models (Kass and Raftery, 1995 
IST and risk premium shocks and the business cycle
This section analyzes the key drivers of the business cycle by looking at the variance decomposition of the observables in both version of the model. Table 4 reports the contribution of each structural shock to the volatility of the observables for the version of the model without the borrowing constraint. The dominant role of IST shocks highlighted by Justiniano et al. (2010) is replicated in this version of the model as 55% of the variance of output growth is accounted for by IST shocks. Risk premium, neutral technology and government spending shocks jointly make up another 30% of the variance of output growth. IST shocks also account for almost all (91%) of the variance of investment growth and a large part of the variance of the nominal interest rate (43%).
In this model IST shocks are particularly important in capturing the decline in output that occurred during the Great Recession. Figure 1 shows the path of output growth when the model is driven solely by IST shocks. Here, IST shocks account for over half of the drop in output growth during the last recession. The premise of our paper is that this result is not robust to the introduction of financial frictions in the form of borrowing constraints.
Introducing a borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs affects the transmission mechanism of IST shocks and thus their relative contribution to the volatility of GDP. The variance decomposition of the observables in Table 5 illustrates that in the model with borrowing constraints, the role of IST shocks is greatly reduced. Apart from consumption and investment, IST shocks account for less than 5% of the volatility of the observable variables. Their contribution to the dynamics of investment remains significant but almost two thirds less than in the model without the borrowing constraint. The higher share of IST shocks in the volatility of consumption reflects these shocks' role in the dynamics of entrepreneurial consumption. In section 4.1, we examine this channel in more detail.
In the model with the borrowing constraint, the main driver of business cycle fluctuations appears to be the risk premium, contributing between 39% and 47% to the variance of the components of GDP. Adding a borrowing constraint also increases the share of risk premium shocks in the variance of total hours and nominal interest rates.
Given its importance in shaping business cycle dynamics, we now examine how the risk premium shock evolves over the business cycle. Figure 2 plots the posterior mean of our estimated risk premium shock and the NBER recession dates which start at the peak of a business cycle and end at the trough. The sample includes every recession from the late 1950s onwards. There is a striking conformity of the risk premium shock with these recessions. At the beginning of each recession the estimated risk premium shock rises sharply, implying that the effective interest rate in the model is highly countercyclical. Moreover, the risk premium and the effective interest rate start to rise before the peak of the boom, in almost every recession in our sample.
The increase in our measure of the risk premium shock is most pronounced during the last recession. Figure 3 illustrates the role of risk premium shocks over the last decade and a half by simulating the path of output assuming that the model is only driven by the estimated risk premium shock. Most of the drop in output growth in the last recession is due to the variation in the risk premium shock. This is in line with the observation that the last recession was driven by sharp disruptions in the financial system resulting in higher interest rate spreads.
IST shocks and collateral constraints
The following two sections flesh out the intuition behind our results starting with the role of IST shocks. In a real business cycle type model, investment rises but consumption falls following a positive IST shock (see for example Barro and King 1984) . A shock that increases the marginal efficiency of investment raises the incentive to invest by more than can be accommodated by an increase in labour effort. As a result, investment can only increase sufficiently if consumption falls. This GDP-consumption co-movement puzzle precludes IST shocks from being a key driver of the business cycle in this type of model. Justiniano et al. (2010) show how this co-movement puzzle can be overcome through a combination of nominal and real rigidities plus variable capital utilization. 9 As a result, their model is able to generate a dominant role for IST shocks over the business cycle, although these shocks have a limited role in accounting for consumption movements. All the features that account for the co-movement puzzle in Justiniano et al. are also present in our model, in addition to the binding borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs. and thus the value of the capital stock used for collateral. The decline in the value of collateral, other things equal, reduces the firm's ability to borrow just when the demand for borrowing coming from investment is high. As a result, investment is reduced relative to the case without borrowing constraints, and entrepreneurs' consumption falls. In terms of the entrepreneur's
Euler equation, (9), a decline in Tobin's q tightens the borrowing constraint causing λ e t to rise, which, other things equal, causes entrepreneurial consumption to fall. In the estimated model entrepreneurs' consumption falls by enough to lead to a decline in aggregate consumption.
Risk premium shocks and borrowing constraints
The volatilities of observed variables ultimately stem from some underlying structural shocks.
In the context of the model with borrowing constraints, the risk premium shocks supplant investment shocks. The same channel that reduces the impact of IST shocks contributes to the increase in the importance of risk premium shocks. Figure 5 shows the transmission mechanism of a risk premium shock. A negative risk premium shock lowers the effective interest rates faced by household and entrepreneurs. This results in higher consumption and output, generating an increased demand for investment and a higher price of capital. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, even in the absence of any borrowing constraint, the lower cost of servicing their debt allows them to increase both their consumption and capital purchases.
The additional asset price channel (higher Tobin's q) implies that they also face a looser borrowing constraint (both λ e t and ε c,t decline in equation (9) causing entrepreneurial consumption to rise). This engenders an amplification of the impact of risk premium shocks for both, consumption and investment. As the response of interest rates and inflation are positive, our model generates positive co-movement between macroeconomic aggregates following a risk premium shock.
Our analysis shows that the introduction of the borrowing constraint alters the transmission mechanisms of both IST and risk premium shocks. The borrowing constraint attenuates the expansionary effects of IST shocks on output, whereas the impact of risk premium shocks is amplified.
Discussion
Our analysis suggests that risk premium shocks, or shocks to the effective interest rate faced by households and firms, are the main driver of the business cycle. This result is attributable to the role played by simple financial frictions in the form of borrowing constraints. An expansionary risk premium shock loosens the borrowing constraint faced by entrepreneurs and thus reduces the cost of transforming household savings into productive capital. In relation to this literature, our results highlight the importance of risk premium shocks.
Although this type of shock is present in canonical DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2007) , its role as a driver of the business cycle only comes to the fore once we introduce the borrowing constraint. In contrast to Christiano et al. (2014) , our risk premium shock becomes important in the presence of financial frictions without using financial data in the estimation of the model. Amano and Shukayev (2012) also find that risk premium shocks play a key role, and are particularly important in driving an economy towards the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Our results share some similarities with Iacoviello (2005) , who points out that, in a model with real estate investments, the effects of borrowing constraints on the amplification of shocks depend on the response of asset prices and consumer price inflation. In his framework, where household debt is denominated in nominal terms, shocks that generate a negative correlation between inflation and output (such as supply shocks), are decelerated while the impact of demand shocks are amplified. Our contribution extends this channel to the case of investment shocks.
Robustness over the sample
This section analyzes the robustness of our results to alternative sample periods. Our baseline estimation period runs from 1954Q3 through to 2011Q4 and therefore encompasses the estimation periods of, amongst others, Justiniano et al. (2010 Justiniano et al. ( , 2011 and Smets and Wouters (2007) . The main conclusion regarding the drivers of the business cycle remains unchanged. In the context of the model with borrowing constraints, the risk premium shock remains the dominant driver of the volatility in the components of GDP.
Conclusion
At the heart of our paper is an identification problem that affects the interpretation of the key drivers of the business cycle. We demonstrate that the introduction of financial frictions materially alters which shocks are thought to be the most important drivers of the business cycle. When entrepreneurs are subject to binding collateral constraints, a reduction in the value of installed capital reduces the value of collateral and thus the amount an entrepreneur can borrow. We find that the dynamic responses of output and consumption to a positive investment shock are materially altered by such collateral constraints. While an investment shock prompts more investment and positive output growth, the behaviour of consumption is completely altered, since the impact effect is for consumption to fall. The investment shock causes collateral values to decline, which reduces entrepreneurs' ability to obtain external finance. Thus, to increase investment entrepreneurs are forced to reduce their consumption. Investment shocks can then no longer generate the positive co-movement that is evident between consumption and investment.
Instead, in the model with collateral constraints, risk premium shocks increase markedly in importance, whereas shocks to investment have a much diminished role, contributing only 4% of the variation in output. Notes: The prior for a parameter is a Normal (N), Beta (β), Gamma (Γ), or inverse-Gamma (Γ −1 ) distribution.
Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior distribution, and the final three columns report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits of 90% Bayesian confidence intervals from the posterior distribution. The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. 
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